Regional study on CIMIC good practices and lessons

ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNDP STABILIZATION PROGRAMME IN THE LAKE CHAD BASIN

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<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>civil-military cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>GSA</td>
<td>government-affiliated security actor</td>
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<td>ISWAP</td>
<td>Islamic State West Africa Province</td>
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<td>JAP</td>
<td>Joint Action Plan</td>
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<td>JAS</td>
<td>Jamaat Anl Al-Sunnah Lil Dawa Wal Jihad</td>
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<td>LCBC</td>
<td>Lake Chad Basin Commission</td>
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<td>MNJTF</td>
<td>Multinational Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>RSF</td>
<td>Regional Stability Facility</td>
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<td>RS-SSR</td>
<td>Regional Strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience of the Boko Haram affected Areas of the Lake Chad Basin</td>
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<td>TAP</td>
<td>Territorial Action Plan</td>
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<td>UN-CMCoord</td>
<td>Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNDSS</td>
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Executive Summary

This study is part of a series of research and policy papers developed by the Regional Stabilization Secretariat to contribute to a body of knowledge on stabilization. It includes research on crime-terror nexus, community-based reconciliation and reintegration, weapons and ammunitions management in Lake Chad Basin, the role of the Police in Stabilization, among others.

The 3rd Governor’s Forum held in October 2021 in Yaoundé, Cameroon, also recommended Lake Chad Basin (LCB) countries, the governments, and administrations of the eight most affected states/territories, to continue their practice of joint reflection and information-sharing as ways of enhancing good practices on cross-border collaboration in the region. These exchanges of local ideas and practices about what works and what does not, is essential for hastening and expanding the success so far enjoyed in the implementation of the Regional Stabilization Strategy (RSS) in the region.

The study on good practices and lessons learned on civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) in the Lake Chad Basin Region is therefore, in line with the above framework. Information provided in this study was collected through three data collection approaches. The first one was a desk review of documents produced by CIMIC Advisors, broader CIMIC and CMCOORD doctrine related materials, quarterly and annual reports from the Regional Stabilization Facility and Regional Stabilization Secretariat, field mission reports, monitoring reports, independent community analysis and perception documents and studies. The second set of information was collected through email interactions, semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions with youth and women representatives and other stakeholders including humanitarian actors working in the Lake Chad Basin area. Finally, field missions were conducted in Diffa (Niger), Hadjer Lamis and Bagasola (Chad) to collect additional primary data.

Information collected during this research has shown that it’s important for CIMIC Advisors to mobilize four key elements: develop a strong understanding of the context; identify key stakeholders to successfully increase CIMIC; develop a good engagement approach; and build confidence and forge an efficient collaboration and coordination strategy, while taking into consideration the speed, scale and policy guidance required for the stabilization intervention. Good practices examples related to hard and soft interventions on CIMIC cooperation have been highlighted in the study. While support to security forces with non-lethal equipment such as vehicles or motorbikes is a common trend across national windows, the study emphasised on capacities which should be developed by CIMIC Advisors, as well as community-based activities aiming at building confidence between security forces and local population.

The deployment of CIMIC Advisors in affected territories as part of the UNDP stabilization programme to support the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) has increased cooperation and collaboration between civilians and security forces both in Joint Action Plans (JAPs) locations and at the regional level. The research does not have the pretention to capture all good practices, but rather to stimulate constructive ideas for improvement.

Some recommendations and next steps have been developed at the end of the study to enhance the impact of civil-military cooperation on stabilization activities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Strengthen coordination and collaboration among CIMIC Advisors and develop a policy document to guide their work. This recommendation includes formalizing the creation of a platform/ network, harmonizing CIMIC Advisor job functions and adopting generic guidelines or an SOP to strengthen CIMIC Advisors role and their activities on the ground.

CIMIC Advisors and their security actors should use the knowledge management platform put in place by the Stabilization Secretariat. A Knowledge Management Platform has been established by Regional Stabilization Secretariat at LCBC and it will serve three purposes: "(i) as the go-to source for news and
information on all aspects of the stabilization, recovery and development effort around Lake Chad; (2) as a repository for assessment reports, lessons learned and good practices, both regional and global; (3) as a dynamic tool for coordination and the networking of practitioners.” A CIMIC cooperation window has been created and therefore will benefit all civil-military practitioners.

Increase resources and support civil-military activities in the Lake Chad Basin Region. The political support shown by governors for CIMIC activities during the 3rd Lake Chad Basin Governors' Forum held in October 2021 must be translated into greater support in human and financial resources to conduct civil-military activities.

The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) should increase CIMIC activities by establishing civil-military operations centres (CMOCs) at sector level, as indicated by the MNJTF CIMIC SOP. CMOCs in the four sectors will help to increase trust, early warning, and early response, with security forces being proactive in responding to intelligence/information provided on Boko Haram movements. In addition, new guidelines adopted to strengthen the work of CIMIC Officers in the Sectors during the Capacity Building Workshop on Civil-Military Cooperation held in November 2022 in N'Djamena, should be disseminated among troops and implemented. It should be part of induction sessions for troops arriving in the mission or deployed in sectors.

National armies and MNJTF should develop a new dynamic in civil-military cooperation in their respective area of operations. As military operations have made significant progress in weakening the number of fighters and offensive capacities of Boko Haram, it’s therefore the appropriate window to reinforce all non-kinetic actions in the fight against Boko Haram.
Introduction

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) contributes to stabilization through “time bound, localized, integrated, civilian programmes” with the primary purpose of building trust between communities and legitimate authorities and laying the foundations for longer-term recovery, peacebuilding and development programmes. The UNDP stabilization approach focuses on: (i) contributing to minimum security conditions, among others, through liaison with security forces and community security programming; (ii) rehabilitating social and productive infrastructure and enhancing state-provided basic services delivery; and (iii) providing immediate livelihood opportunities, such as emergency employment and grants. This approach emphasizes the localized nature of interventions, a limited time frame for achieving intended results, civilian leadership, delivering a tangible peace dividend and the desire to increase legitimate political authority.

Experience shows that to implement stabilization programmes, “business-as-usual” is not an option. Instead, stabilization requires a mindset that delivers large-scale interventions in fragile contexts with a sense of urgency while always putting the legitimate recipient authority at the forefront to improve the social contract between the state and communities. UNDP’s stabilization approach requires collaboration with local, national and, in some cases, international security forces. It’s highly a political process.

In 2019, building on its experience in Iraq, Libya and Somalia, UNDP developed a Regional Stabilization Facility to support the Lake Chad Basin Commission to implement its five-year stabilization programme. Within this framework, Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Advisors have been deployed across the region for the achievement of specific objectives, including supporting security forces to have minimum security conditions in specific localities and building trust between communities, security forces and local authorities. In the same vein, the Facility has displayed a strong commitment for knowledge management to facilitate improved and better coordinated stabilization practices of all stakeholders working in the Lake Chad region.

To contribute to this goal, RSS Secretariat has decided to develop this study on CIMIC good practices and lessons learned, that captures CIMIC Advisors’ experiences and challenges in their duties in Lake Chad Basin Region. The study has been organised into three parts. In the first part, the study summarizes the general security situation and the programmatic background of UNDP intervention in the Lake Chad Region. Additionally, the first part also provides a brief theoretical framework related to the concept of civil-military cooperation as well as the research methodology.

In the second and third part respectively, the study expatiates some identified lessons learned and good practices while also sharing some challenges. Lastly, the study provides “Generic Guidelines” for CIMIC Advisors that draws on the rich experiences of various actors with the aim of providing guidance and improved actions.

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1 Security Forces are statutory organizations (i.e., set-up by law) with public and internal security mandates. The term encompasses armed forces (Army, Navy and Air Force, among others); police (national police, community police, among others); intelligence services; border control and paramilitary forces (for example, the Gendarmerie).

I. Context & approach of the study

1.1 GENERAL SECURITY SITUATION IN THE LAKE CHAD REGION

Over the past years, the Lake Chad Basin Region has been heavily plagued with an evolving security crisis dominated by extremist activities employed by Boko Haram, an Islamic group created in 2002 in Maiduguri, Nigeria, by Mohammed Yusuf. Following the death of Mohammed Yusuf, Abubakar Shekau took over the leadership of the group in 2009. He perpetrated violent attacks against civilians and government infrastructure, killing men, women and children, abducting many others. Despite interventions by the military and the police, Boko Haram expanded its operations into Northern Cameroon and, subsequently, to Niger and Chad in early 2015.

In August 2016, due to internal disputes, the group splintered. Many fighters left Boko Haram, also known as Jamaat Ahl Al-Sunnah Li Dawwa Wal Jihad (JAS) to create the Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP) led by the late Abu Musab al-Barnawi. Another group that splintered from Boko Haram, is Ansaru, which is linked to Al Qaeda. In May 2021, new clashes between the JAS and ISWAP led to the killing of Abubakar Shekau, which has given more strength to ISWAP in the region.

In 2015, in response to the crisis, the African Union (AU) and the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), signed an agreement for the operationalization of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), to conduct military operations against Boko Haram, intercept trafficked weapons, free hostages and encourage defections of militants, with the aim of bringing an end to the Boko Haram insurgency. Simultaneously, national armies have continued to fight insurgency groups - over the past months, security forces of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger have made some gains in the fight against Boko Haram. Between March and June 2022, military operations such as Lake Sanity (led by MNJTF) and Desert Sanity (led by the Nigerian Army) have been conducted into the islands of Lake Chad, called the “tumbun.” Many terrorists were killed, weapons were seized, Boko Haram’s businesses were destroyed and hostages, including women and children, were freed.

Since mid-2021 after the killing of Abubakar Shekau, some JAS combatants and their dependants surrendered, mostly in Nigeria and Cameroon. From official sources, the combatants and their dependants who have surrendered are at least 70,000 people. This situation has put more pressure on Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration efforts. Solid cooperation and coordination among the MNJTF and national armies are critical to maintain the momentum on military pressure, as despite the gains made by security forces, the terrorist groups continue to attack, kill, and abduct civilians across the region. The situation has severe impact on the humanitarian situation.

According to OCHA, across the Lake Chad Basin, in Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, 11 million people need humanitarian assistance. After nearly 13 years of violence, basic social services and already limited natural resources are severely strained and 300,000 children are severely malnourished. About 1,037 schools are non-functional across the Lake Chad Basin due to insecurity and violence, depriving thousands of children of an education. 2.8 million are internally displaced, including 2 million in Nigeria alone, and 287,000 are refugees. To adequately address the region’s most pressing humanitarian needs and assist 7.5 million people, response plans in the region require US$2.57 billion.

1.2 DYNAMIC POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND GEOGRAPHIC ENVIRONMENTS

Located across West and Central Africa, the Lake Chad Basin which spans Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria is a huge and semi-arid geographic area of diverse cultures and communities, with different levels (regional and local) of security challenges. According to the World Bank, the region faces a combination of long-term structural barriers to development, which has resulted in a situation of acute fragility that is trapping the region’s thirty (30) million inhabitants in a vicious cycle of low growth and poverty. The populations living in the Lake Chad Basin depend heavily on the Lake Chad for their livelihoods (for example, access to water for farming, livestock rearing, drinking, fishing, and hunting). The pressure on these resources is increasing significantly because of intensified extraction.
and climate change. This has caused the shrinking of the Lake over the past four decades from 25,000 km² to only 2,500 km², thereby heavily impacting the economic activities and food security in the Lake Chad Basin area.

Various ethnic groups are in the Lake Chad Basin area. The main languages across the region include, but are not limited to, Buduma, Kanuri, Kanembu, Hausa, Fulani, Kotoko and Hausa. Meanwhile, English is the official language in Nigeria; French is the official language in Niger; whereas French and Arabic are official languages in Chad; while English and French are official languages in Cameroon.

Moreo, the political, administrative, judicial, and military architecture are developed along lines inherited from the colonial era and this should be taken into consideration on the security and rule of law approach of the four affected countries. The judicial system in Nigeria is based on common law, while in Niger and Chad, it is mainly based on civil law. Cameroon is an exception with the combination of the two systems, common law operating in the two Anglophone regions - North-west and South-west, and French civil law in the eight francophone regions. In Cameroon, Chad and Niger you will find the gendarmerie. The gendarmerie security force is a branch of the armed forces, but with responsibility to maintain law and order internally and perform investigation duties like the police.

The situation in Lake Chad Basin is part of broader security challenges in the Sahel and across Africa, with terrorist armed groups developing networks and cross-border strategies to create sanctuaries and challenge national, regional, and international security forces operating in the regions. Indeed, the UNDP paper Crime and Terror Nexus released in 2022 indicates that, “ISWAP and other insurgent groups has relied on an elaborate network of contacts and routes cutting across West and North Africa (Libya-Algeria-Mali-Niger-Nigeria) to facilitate the movements of fighters.” The study further elaborates: “(…) The proliferation of weapons from Gaddafi-era stockpiles has enabled armed actors operating throughout the Sahel, including in Chad and Niger, to acquire arms. Bandits in this zone forged ties with the cross-border trafficking networks and recruited from various ethnic groups in the region.

Some of these ethnic groups are situated in countries with pre-colonial linkages that are nurtured by common languages, cultures, professional networks and religion. Their involvement transcends national boundaries and reflect to a large extent the cross-border undertones of crime and terror in the region.”

Consequently, terrorist threats and attacks expand from the Sahel region and affect more and more coastal states such as Benin, Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana. In response, these countries, launched in 2017, Accra Initiative to address the spreading of terrorist threats to the Gulf of Guinea, with recent counterterrorism plans. The global insecurity situation in the Sahel triggered political instability in some countries, particularly in Mali and Burkina Faso. The two countries experienced military coups over the past three years. Social media influencing power have also contributed to increasing anti-Western and pro-Russian sentiment in the population, including growing resentments against regional organizations, international community, and some foreign countries military deployments.

For CIMIC Advisors, having this conflict sensitivity background when working in Lake Chad Basin and Sahel regions is very important and useful.

1.3 PROGRAMMATIC BACKGROUND

In 2018, three years after the deployment of MNJTF, and despite significant progress made by the Joint Force, national, regional and international actors agreed that overall collective success of the fight against Boko Haram is contingent upon coherent acceleration and completion of the second phase of the MNJTF’s mandate, namely to “facilitate the implementation of overall stabilization programmes by the LCBC Member States and Benin in the affected areas, including the full restoration of state authority and the return of the Internally Displaced Populations and refugees.” To achieve this, the LCBC was tasked by its Member States to develop the mechanisms and processes required to consolidate the gains of the MNJTF.
Therefore, the LCBC developed a five-year strategy, the "Regional Strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience of the Boko Haram affected Areas of the Lake Chad Basin" (RS-SRR). The Strategy targets eight (8) specific territories affected by the Boko Haram crisis. These territories include Adamawa, Borno and Yobe and States in Nigeria, North and Far North Regions in Cameroon, Diffa in Niger and Hadjer Lamis and Lac Provinces in Chad.

Map 1: The eight affected states, regions and provinces in the Lake Chad Basin countries.

The Strategy provides a comprehensive, integrated, and multi-level framework for overall stabilization, recovery and resilience, comprising 9 inter-related pillars\(^8\) and 40 strategic objectives which include support to the MNJTF, provision of humanitarian assistance and other key interventions such as Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration and cross-border interventions. The RS-SRR recognizes the nexus between Peace, Humanitarian and Development issues and calls for a "New Way of Working" to be at the heart of the response to the Lake Chad Basin region crisis. It notes that strong coordination between institutions and governments at all levels and between United Nations agencies and entities, including international community partners, civil society actors and the private sector, is needed to achieve it. Above all, the RS-SRR underlines the need to build trust for the long term, between communities, security providers, local and national authorities, through effective civil-military joint commitment. This cooperation is essential to ensure a successful move from humanitarian assistance to sustainable development.

In 2019, UNDP developed a financing facility programme to support the LCBC Stabilization Strategy and national governments of the four-riparian countries’ response to the crisis\(^9\) through two mechanisms:

The first one is the Regional Stabilization Facility (RSF) whose objective is to support immediate stabilization of targeted areas in the eight affected territories where communities remain vulnerable to continued infiltration and attack. In that regard, four delivery units referred to as “National Windows” have been established respectively in Nigeria (Maiduguri), Niger (Diffa), Cameroon (Maroua) and Chad (Bo). These National Windows aim to achieve the following three outputs:

(i) improved community safety and security;
(ii) provision of functioning essential infrastructure and basic services; and
(iii) availability of livelihood opportunities.

In that regard, UNDP develops Joint Action Plans (JAPs), a mechanism consisting in identifying specific localities in the above targeted regions to implement stabilization activities. For example, in Chad, within the department of Hadjer Lamis Province, six localities were selected in the first stabilization phase, which has an initial duration of eighteen (18) months to two years. These localities are

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\(^8\) These include: Pillar 1: Political Cooperation; Pillar 2: Security and Human Rights; Pillar 3: Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation; Reintegration and people associated with Boko Haram; Pillar 4: Humanitarian Aid; Pillar 5: Governance and social contract; Pillar 6: Socio-economic recovery and environmental sustainability; Pillar 7: Education, Learning and Skills; Pillar 8: Prevention of Violent Extremism and Peacebuilding; Pillar 9: Empowerment and inclusion of women and young people. Strategic Objectives related to gender are crosscutting and guide CIMIC work.

\(^9\) In Nigeria, the Buhari Plan of 2016 provides the overarching framework for engagement in the Northeast of the country. Operation Lafia Dole registered significant military progress against the insurgency; the establishment of Operation Safe Corridor provides rehabilitation and reintegration support to low-risk Boko Haram-associated persons. Cameroon has deployed thousands of troops under Operation Alpha, Operation Emergence 4 and joint operations with neighbouring countries in an attempt to curtail the growing security threats in the Far North Region. In 2016, Chad began close cooperation and collaboration with its neighbours, sending two thousand troops to Niger to support counter-insurgency efforts in the Diffa Region—the region in Niger which has been most affected by the crisis. Niger set up demobilization sites in 2016 and has adopted a special and comprehensive security and stabilization framework “Projet de Stratégie de Sortie de Crise de Terrorisme dans la Region diffa” for the support of the Diffa Region.
Guite, Baltram, Miterine, Mahacia, Sidje, Kassarale. Meanwhile in Lac Province, eight localities were selected. These localities include Ngalamia, Koulikime, Oumourou Ngoroua, Tchoukouflou, Daboua, Tateron, Baga Sola.10

Therefore, a first step of cooperation and collaboration between civilians (state government representatives, UNDP Regional Stabilization Facility staff, community and religious leaders, women, and youth representatives) and military authorities was needed, to design Joint Action Plans for the immediate stabilization of specific target areas. Meanwhile, continuous civil-military cooperation in JAPs locations is required to implement stabilization activities which include establishing minimum security conditions, providing essential services as well as livelihood opportunities necessary to sustain peace and allow longer-term social cohesion.

The second mechanism put in place by UNDP is the establishment of a ‘Regional Window’ to support an extended stabilization process (spanning three to five years) to facilitate the transition from humanitarian assistance to long-term stabilization and resilience. This window has three outputs: (i) enhanced capacity of the LCBC to implement the RSS; (ii) improved cross-border cooperation and coordination; and (iii) development of Territorial Action Plans (TAPs) and functioning coordination mechanisms.

At the regional level, the Stabilization Strategy established a joint LCBC-MNJTF Civil Military Cooperation Cell with the objective to “have a particular focus on planning, sequencing and coordinating initiatives for extending humanitarian access, for the safe cross-border return of refugees and for the secure opening of borders in support of human mobility and cross-border trade, following bilateral government agreements to do so.”11

As stated by UNDP in its Stabilization Brief of 8 December 2021, stabilization programming takes place in contexts and areas where military action, a political settlement or change in conflict dynamics have established a basic level of security. Moreover, international, regional, or national security forces’ willingness and capacities to continue providing a minimum level of security in the foreseeable future is a key factor driving the decision to engage in a stabilization programme. Therefore, stabilization is highly a political decision with commitments from governments, international actors and security forces joining their efforts.

As a political project: It is conceived, authorized, led, and owned by the national and local government. UNDP’s role is to operationalize the stabilization process at the local level. The stabilization programme supports the institutions — regional, national, local authorities — to lead on decision-making regarding the location and, in coordination with the community, on the type of projects to be implemented. A central stabilization objective is to facilitate the return of the state and its governing structures, reinforcing the legitimacy of and trust in it. To implement its stabilization programme, both at the territorial and regional level, UNDP deployed CIMIC Advisors in the national windows and at the regional level. Their role and contributions to the overall stabilization programme are the main purposes of this study.

1.4 CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION AND STABILIZATION

The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations has developed a Policy on “Civil-Military Coordination in United Nations Integrated Peacekeeping Missions (UN-CIMIC).” According to the policy, UN-CIMIC is a military staff function that contributes to facilitating the interface between military and civilian components, which also includes humanitarian and development actors [international organizations and international non-governmental organizations] in the mission area. UN-CIMIC supports the mission, and particularly United Nations military components whose primary role is providing a secure and stable environment, within which humanitarian/development actors may also carry out their activities. The policy emphasizes the importance of the role of United Nations CIMIC personnel in collecting, verifying, analysing and sharing information with all mission components and mission partners to fulfil United Nations Security Council mandates, with particular emphasis on protection of civilians (POC). This United Nations policy is directly related to United Nations Peacekeeping Missions.

OCHA has also developed a set of policies and frameworks to coordinate interactions between humanitarian actors and military components. The Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) is described by OCHA as “the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate, pursue...
common goals.12 In short, humanitarian civil-military coordination (UN-CMCooord) led by OCHA deals with interactions between humanitarian actors and the military in support of humanitarian objectives, notably support humanitarian organization to deliver humanitarian assistance to people in need. Other political and military organizations such as NATO have developed their doctrine or approach on Civil-Military issues during natural disasters or situations of armed conflicts. According to Brzoska and Ehrhart in their Policy Paper, Civil-Military Cooperation in Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Reconstruction, the increasing complexity of interactions between civilian and military has generated many different conceptual approaches. According to the authors, it’s better to go beyond this complexity and distinguish between civil-military interaction (CMI) in the broader sense which is civil-military coordination at the strategic level, while CMI in the narrower sense should be understood as CIMIC, i.e., civil-military cooperation on the ground.

Meanwhile Holshek and de Coning, in their book Civil-Military Coordination in Peace Operations16 also indicate that regardless of doctrinal approach, interactions between the military and civilians are essentially about managing interactions among disparate players involved in or peripheral to the peace process and managing the transition from conflict to peace. These interactions involve dialogue and interface among the civilian, police and military components. Brzoska and Ehrhart also share similar views by highlighting that:

For UNDP, the ultimate objective of interactions and engagements with security forces is to create and ensure reasonable guarantee of security for community for the implementation of the stabilisation programme and support community-level security interventions, which is the first pillar of Stabilisation at national level. The CIMIC Advisor role is to assist the Resident Representative, Country Office staff and Stabilization Teams that engage with security forces at national, regional or local levels, depending on their area of deployment. While engagement will be conducted with all aspects of a nation’s security forces, including the army, the provision of equipment is limited to the police and the gendarmerie, specifically excluding the provision of equipment to the army. The words ‘security forces’ here refers to the police and the gendarmerie.

UNDP normally only provide support to recognised elements of a nation’s security forces, including Government-affiliated Security Actors (GSAs), such as the Civilian Joint Task Force in Nigeria, in compliance with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy, and in some circumstances after a risk analysis process through the UNDP Enterprise Risk Management Policy and Procedures.16

1.5 SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

Since the launch of the Stabilization programme in Lake Chad Basin, UNDP has provided multifaceted support to security forces, notably supplies of non-lethal equipment, including motorcycles, 4x4 vehicles, fuel or the construction of police or immigration service offices. In addition, UNDP, through CIMIC Advisors, has supported a wide range of community-level security interventions such as dialogues with security forces, capacity building of civil society actors and security forces, setting up of early warning system, or peace infrastructures. CIMIC Advisors also facilitated cross-border cooperation, cooperation and coordination mechanisms.

Therefore, the development of the study which is limited to Lake Chad Basin Stabilization Programme has the objective to capture in a comprehensive document the work undertaken by CIMIC Advisors in diverse contexts,

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12 Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination | OCHA (unocha.org).
highlight similarities and differences, good practices and lessons on civil-military cooperation in the implementation of the regional stabilization strategy in Lake Chad Basin Region and propose generic guidelines for CIMIC Advisors in the fulfilment of their duties and engagement with stakeholders. The hope is that the sharing of these pieces of information will positively impact CIMIC Advisors in their daily work, not only in Lake Chad Basin but also in Liptako Gourma region both at the strategic and operational levels and to guide appropriate policy level discussions.

Information provided in this study was collected through three data collection approaches. The first one was a desk review of documents produced by CIMIC Advisors, broader CIMIC and UN-CMCoord doctrine related materials, quarterly and annual reports of the Regional Stabilization Facility and Regional Stabilization Secretariat field mission Reports, monitoring reports, independent community analysis and perception documents and studies. The second set of data was collected through email interactions, semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions with youth and women representatives and other discussions with humanitarian and stakeholders working in the LCBC area. The objective of this data collection approach was to reach a broad spectrum of sources and experiences on Lake Chad Basin CIMIC activities by considering dimensions such as, regional and national window coverage, stakeholder diversity: UNDP RSS and country teams, regional and national security structures, regional government actors, RSS donors with security perspectives. In addition, two field missions were conducted in Diffa (Niger) and Hadjer Lamis and Bagasola (Chad) to collect additional primary data. The study has captured good practices undertaken by CIMIC Advisors, as well as some challenges.
Once deployed in the field, the Civil-Military Advisors are confronted with a variety of situations and actors with whom they must interact to build a strategy that can enable them to achieve the objectives of the stabilization programme. The information and general advice received prior to deployment are then compared with the reality on the ground. As highlighted above, the Lake Chad Region has multiple security, geographical, climatic, social and economic challenges, but is also a land for opportunities due to important natural resources.

Information collected during this research has shown that it is important for the CIMIC Advisor to mobilize four key elements: build a strong understanding of the context; identify key actors; formulate a good engagement approach; and an efficient collaboration and coordination strategy, while considering the speed and scale required for the stabilization intervention.

The decision on designating a Joint Action Plan (JAP) location requires engagement of numerous actors. Not all JAP locations have been designated with the involvement of a CIMIC Advisor. In some circumstances, JAP localities have been proposed by the local or political authority. If he is involved in the process or if he has joined the area after the designation of JAP localities, the CIMIC Advisor should, during his engagement with the military or political leadership, emphasize that the JAP community must be properly secured by an effective military or police unit, depending on the level of stability in the area.

Many factors contribute to or detract from stability within a community. Determining factors of instability will help the CIMIC Advisor recommend CIMIC actions most likely to create stability. Many tools are available to conduct conflict analysis, assess civilians at risk and risks associated with stabilization programme implementation and how to better protect civilians, in collaboration with security forces. In short, two key reasons to conduct conflict analysis are: to inform decisions on which activities to support in terms of immediate stabilization, showing how these will build stability, and to ensure that all activities are conflict sensitive. Developing conflict analysis, identifying risk factors in X,Y,Z community (for example presence of refugees returning from Boiko Haram, terrorist incursions, migrants, community conflicts, herder-farmer conflict, proximity to Lake Chad, risks associated with stabilization programme implementation) and then determining what are the elements that could bring stability such as local peace infrastructures, deployment of security forces, construction of infrastructure, support with vehicles, motorbikes or communication equipment, fuel, etc... are functions that the CIMIC Advisor should perform, in consultation with key identified resources. Ultimately, the Advisor should present the outcomes of these analysis during interactions with government security forces.
After collection of information on security issues, it is recommended that the CIMIC Advisor should develop a JAP Security Plan which can help mitigate security risks. The Security Plan should include, at least: the security situation; security measures already being taken and those required to address insecurity; roles and responsibilities of actors involved; the governance structures to ensure implementation of the plan; any security assumptions; and how threats to ongoing security can be established, i.e., through Early Warning at various levels of authority/intelligence. Once written, the JAP Security Plan should be subject to review and measures then put in place to ensure it provides the security anticipated. The JAP security Plan can include the below elements in these tables, including gender and child protection aspects.

To cite an example, in Maroua, Cameroon, to address real-time security challenges, the CIMIC Advisor supported civil society actors to draft a ‘Community Security Coordination Concept.’ As developed below in Figure 4, it was a very basic five-page document for each JAP Community, outlining the security force deployments in the community.

It helped communities to understand how they can work together with security forces, what their respective roles can be and how they can support each other. The document also reinforced the linkages between UNDP and the community.

**FIGURE 1: ELEMENTS FOR A JAP SECURITY PLAN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 1: Analysis and understanding of the context</th>
<th>Information collected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armed / bandit groups operating in the area. In which locality?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community conflicts in the area.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security forces present in the area. Identify area of deployments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of Political/ Administrative presence in the area</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Step 2: JAP SECURITY PLAN</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
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<td>--------------------------------</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Figure 2: A Community Security Coordination Concept Developed in Maroua, Cameroon

Watch Tower - Tour de guet

Daytime overwatch of possible terrorist approach routes forces them to find other routes (restricting their movement and channeling them into areas they can be caught) and gives confidence to agricultural and blood workers.

Equipment for Watchtower team: Binoculars, mobile phone (for security forces), loud hailer

Le surveillance pendant la journée des litanies possibles d’approche terroriste sur la voie des litanies (en restreignant leurs déplacements et en les conduisant vers des zones où ils peuvent être capturés) et donne confiance aux travailleurs agricoles et bovins.

Équipement pour l’équipe du tour de guet: jumelles, téléphone portable (pour les forces de sécurité), haut-parleur

Increase agricultural areas by moving back forests that terrorists use to either sneak up on communities or shoot at people - Augmenter les zones agricoles en déplaçant les forêts que les terroristes utilisent pour se rapprocher des communautés ou tirer sur les gens

Before - Avant

After - Après

Increase agricultural areas near communities by removing damaged buildings that terrorists use to either sneak up on communities or shoot at people - Augmenter les zones agricoles en supprimant les bâtiments abîmés que les terroristes utilisent pour se rapprocher des communautés ou tirer sur les gens

Before - Avant

After - Après

Improving emergency roads in the community

- Améliorer les communications d’urgence communautaires

Before - Avant

Community under attack - Communauté attaquée

Water crossing - Traversée d’eau

Dangerous roadblocks

- Les blocages dangereux

Stockpiles - Stock de poulie

Risky areas - Zones à risques

After - Après

Guard Civil post at Community Entrance - Poste de garde civil à l’entrée de la communauté

Before - Avant

When people are blocked off from the rest of society, they may react with violence.

Leurs populations perçoivent le peuple en bloc, généralement pour laisser une impression. L’insécurité sociale est un problème important qui affecte les communautés.

Walls, Dykes and Ditches - Des Murs, Dykes et Fossés

Before - Avant

Walls and Dykes can block routes, force terrorists to walk, or try to�

Les Murs et les Diques peuvent bloquer les routes, obliger les terroristes à marcher ou essayer d’autres routes.

Dyke and ditch will stop all vehicles and if it’s filled with water, they can irrigate crops.

Les Murs et les diques peuvent bloquer les routes, obliger les terroristes à marcher ou essayer d’autres routes. Les diques et les fossés peuvent arrêter tous les véhicules et, si elle est remplie d’eau, elle peut irriguer les cultures.

Improving community emergency communications

- Améliorer les communications d’urgence communautaires

Before - Avant

When an attack occurs, speed is vital. The first emergency communications that respect “Priority and Non-interference” do not allow an armed community to contact the forces that will ACTUALLY STORM THE ATTACK FIRST, by every way possible.

Lorsqu’une attaque se produit, l’urgence est vitale. Les premières communications qui respectent la “Priorité et Non-intervention” ne permettent pas à un groupe armé de contacter les forces qui auront ACTivement STORMER LA première attaque, par toutes les voies possibles.

Inform the community of the danger and the next steps using LA TTE DIALOG, OMD (OSS les forces militaires)-

Informer la communauté de la menace et les prochaines étapes en utilisant LA TTE DIALOG, OMD (OSS forces militaires)
Very common interventions documented through various national windows are support to security forces with non-lethal equipment, vehicles and construction. For example, in Chad in 2021, the national window provided motorcycles and fuel for vehicles and boats. It has allowed security forces to increase security patrols on land and on the islands (33 in 2019). In Nigeria for example, in 2021, 17 law enforcement facilities were rehabilitated or constructed in six localities which enhanced civil policing. In Banki, Nigeria, the completion of security trenching, the construction of a perimeter wall and solar-powered street lighting and security out-posts successfully prevented attacks by Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) which drastically reduced civilian casualties. Solar-powered streetlights were installed in some localities, which strengthened security surveillance. In Niger, in 2021, 21 4x4 vehicles including an ambulance were provided, supporting Security Force mobility. Solar lighting units were provided for electricity at 12 security outfits. The provision of equipment was conducted with a clear analysis and a detailed risk mitigation process. Since the project began there have been successful supplies of the following

2.2. STAKEHOLDER MAPPING AND MANAGING EXPECTATIONS

CIMIC work involves interacting with various internal and external actors at many levels and across a broad base of activities. In national windows, there are two set of actors. The first one is at the provincial level, for example Maiduguri in Nigeria and Diffa in Niger, where the CIMIC Advisor should engage with the governor and his office, representatives of international non-governmental organizations, UN-CMCoord officers, United Nations agencies, funds and programmes representatives, senior security forces, universities, prominent civil society actors, media, women and youth leaders, donors or their representatives. At a lower level, in JAP locations, the CIMIC Advisor works with local authorities, security forces, government-affiliated security actors, religious and community leaders, civil society, including youth and women’s groups, herders and farmers’ networks and local media.
Therefore, to be successful, the CIMIC Advisor should identify the right stakeholders who can support him/her to deliver a rapid and successful outcome for the stabilization programme. The engagement of the right stakeholder is important because it enhances efficiency and effectiveness for the delivery of the programme. It is therefore productive to develop a stakeholder mapping, with the role and responsibilities of each actor and how they can contribute to achieve the mandate.

Taking the example of collaboration with security forces into consideration, CIMIC Advisors in the Lake Chad Basin Region operate not only with statutory security forces, but also with Government-Affiliated Security Actors (GSAs). Statutory security forces are those established by law with public, internal and external security mandates and the term encompasses armed forces, police, gendarmerie,
intelligence services, border control forces, correctional services, etc. GSAs are often called Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) in Nigeria, Groupe d’Auto-defense or Comité de Vigilance in Niger, Chad and Cameroon. These actors, which number several thousands, can be officially armed or unarmed and conduct operations which are coordinated with and by statutory security forces.

Sometimes, GSAs are the only functioning security forces present when violent extremist (VE) groups attack affected communities. Hence, the involvement of these in security related aspect of a UNDP implementation project should be considered in local solutions. CIMIC Advisors should therefore understand which security actors in the programme area are effective and, more significantly, which ones are trusted by the local community, or are willing to make efforts to secure that trust. The involvement of GSAs and UNDP support should be, however, properly weighed and discussed with the Resident Representative or the Head of Stabilization, in line with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy assessment and mitigation measures.

There could be some misconceptions or misunderstandings among some stakeholders about the role of the CIMIC Advisor. Some stakeholders could have the perception that the CIMIC Advisor can have some ‘authority’ over security forces. They do not understand the fact that there are never enough security forces and that these forces are overstretched and some are untrained and unfamiliar with their roles. In addition, there are instances where some stakeholders do not realize that it can take more time to train security personnel properly than it takes to build infrastructure to house them. So, although there may be new police accommodation and offices built, if security forces turn up untrained, they tend to lose the added value they initially represented. The same applies to the use of new technology solutions. Some stakeholders desire security solutions from new technology or capability such as CCTV or drones, but if that technology or capability cannot be maintained and sustained once purchased, it will be useless. If a security solution cannot be sustained, the advice should be to stick with systemic or community-based solutions because they will deliver a longer lasting effect.

These misplaced expectations mean the CIMIC Advisor must have a good understanding of the realities on the ground regarding the role of security forces and exhibit the courage to manage stakeholders’ expectations. The management of these expectations is for the CIMIC Advisor to give true and balanced information to various stakeholders, especially external ones, who wish to see security aspects improve immediately because of the financial and human efforts made. It is important to explain that a lot of work is needed at all levels, and it can take time.

“I’ve heard donors ask me, so what’s your plan when JAP ‘X’ is attacked? After my initial shock, my response: “Hum, well, it’s not in my remit to lead the cavalry in repelling a real time RPG/mortar/gun truck attack. That’s for the security forces to determine.”

CIMIC Advisor, Nigeria

CIMIC Advisors, particularly those operating in National Windows, should also need to help local actors understand that UNDP teams provide immediate stabilization; their efforts are not meant to be forever. They should explain that the long-term stabilization is in the hands of their provincial and national authorities through Territorial Action Plans, which is a collective commitment of national, regional and international partners including UNDP, under the leadership of their Governors. The CIMIC Advisor must therefore carefully consider the type of advice provided and manage expectations so as not to start overly ambitious activities and leave unfinished projects.
2.3 ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING

While developing a good mapping of actors at the governorate, JAP locations or at the regional level, it is important to have a good strategy to engage all these stakeholders. In fact, the processes described above do not follow a chronological order, but rather occur concurrently. The most important thing is to keep these mechanisms in mind and to implement them in the field.

For example, it is recommended that once deployed, the CIMIC Advisor should have formal interactions with political authorities, force or sector commanders. The practice of establishing relationships through these interactions has been reiterated as a good practice. Formally introducing oneself as the CIMIC Advisor to political authorities, security forces and commanders at the regional or local levels should happen early in the CIMIC Advisor’s or the commander’s appointment. The Head of Stabilization or someone having a leadership role, the Deputy Resident Representative or the Programme Team Leader, already known in the area, should lead this formal introduction. Engagement should occur before CIMIC activities commence and ideally through a meeting at the senior government official and/or the commander’s office. This is particularly critical for the Commander who does not like engagement with officers or personnel under his command without his express permission. The context also applies to political/administrative and military authorities to know exactly the people they are dealing with. In the same vein, these commanders and political actors would like to understand what type of CIMIC activities are envisaged in their area of responsibility, the CIMIC approach the Advisor will take and how mutual support can be established. Usually, the Force Commander will provide a point of contact from his/her Staff, usually the Chief J9, who will become a close partner in CIMIC.

This introductory exercise is valid at all levels. For example, at the regional level, a CIMIC Advisor, upon arrival in N’Djamena, would be introduced to the Executive Secretary of LCBC, as well as to the Force Commander by the Head of the Secretariat. These introductions provide the CIMIC Adviser with strategic guidance for the work ahead. Subsequently, the CIMIC Advisor can establish formal contacts with direct stakeholders to enable implementation of the mandate. Of course, these formal introductions should not be limited to political and military leaders alone. At the level of national windows, for example, experience shows that it is important to make oneself known very early to local political and administrative authorities. It is also important to report one’s presence to key religious and community leaders.

At the community level, where power structures are seemingly obvious at first sight but then opaque on closer examination, the CIMIC Advisor should have the capacity to identify the ‘community’ intellectual leaders who understand security issues and can provide support for peace projects. Stabilization success relies a lot on strong community engagement. Community engagement includes building key contacts in the community, including local authorities and security providers, continuous relationship and permanent evaluation of these contacts to determine if they remain reliable sources of information.

If the CIMIC Advisor is an international staff member, the Advisor will need support from local insiders who can introduce them to key local leaders and help them develop a network of peacebuilders. In a region where there is, on one hand, a persistent mutual mistrust between civilians and the military and, on the other hand, among civilians themselves, building trust with local leaders is vital.

In the Chad National Window for example, Community Assistants have been recruited in JAP locations and at the governorate office level. Their role is to facilitate missions and activities on the ground, as well as to facilitate civilian-military interactions and support the work of the Stabilization Committees. Their knowledge of the local context and good connection to the population make them ideal facilitators and allows them to implement a wide variety of activities on the ground. However, there is a security risk assessment to make prior to their recruitment, in collaboration with the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS), to make sure that their work in their local communities will not affect their safety and security.

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17 As of November 1st, 2022, the table in annex summarize deployments of Community Assistants in JAP locations.
Therefore, the recruitment and deployment of national volunteers or community assistants is a good practice to have successful engagements with community members, local security forces, religious and community leaders, women and youth groups. Community Assistants are locals who have a very strong knowledge of the context where stabilization projects take place and therefore have a comparative advantage to build good relationships with local communities, with the required knowledge to address linguistic and cultural obstacles which are challenges for international staff.

Recruiting and deploying national staff is not enough to gain the trust of local communities and their traditional and religious leaders. The research shows that other aspects should also be considered.

Respecting the authorities, community and religious leaders. It may seem obvious but respecting the national authority and local leaders within a community is more than simply showing respect to their rank and position and keeping them informed. They represent their communities at various levels and hold a great deal of knowledge and experience. They can advise CIMIC Advisors about solutions and approaches which will work well at a community level. Highlighting to them their role in CIMIC will lead to dialogue and their commitment to champion CIMIC work and continue to encourage community engagement in CIMIC activities. This is vital in UNDP JAP communities which need to continue CIMIC activities once the UNDP effort is concluded. For community leaders in particular, their engagement should be conducted early, visibly and frequently by the CIMIC Advisor.

Community leaders must be engaged before work commences and ideally each community visit should commence with a meeting at the offices of the national authority and local leaders. Regardless of the CIMIC Advisor’s personal faith or position on the role of religion in the stability of the region, he/she should hold an appreciation of the role religious and community leaders play within the community. Their views span the fight against disinformation, the socio-economic life of the community, Boko Haram related security issues, restoration of business opportunities in the area, civil-military cooperation and community protection. The CIMIC Advisor should consult with the religious and community leaders of a community often and early for their insight and to acknowledge their role and significance as gatekeepers in the community and as stakeholders of CIMIC community activities.

In the areas where JAP locations are being established, these respectful relationships can often help ease local tensions. At local community level, their governance structures are powerful and more trusted by the populace than the governmental structures which can be seen as ‘distant’ and can be intimidating. At the local governance level, there will be a trusted advisor to the head of the community and someone who provides security advice. Both should be engaged by the CIMIC Advisor and strong trusted relationships developed with them to all extent possible.

For example, engagement with community and religious leaders has been very important to the Regional CIMIC Advisor. In July and August 2021, four missions organized by the LCBC-MNJTF CIMIC Cell, respectively in Mora (Sector 1) on 13 July, Diffe (Sector 3) on 26 July, Monguno (Sector 4) on 20 August and Bagasola (Sector 2) on 24 August, took place to officially handover medicines to sector commanders for further distribution and assistance to local communities. In each sector, community dialogues led by the civilian component of the CIMIC Cell were conducted in the margins of the medical outreach, with the aim to interact with community and religious leaders, familiarize them with the role of the MNJTF and the LCBC/ MNJTF Regional CIMIC Cell, particularly on activities with direct impact on the lives within communities.
In Mora (Cameroon), local and religious leaders of the Wandala Sultanate attended the medical outreach and provided the opportunity for discussion with LCBC-MNJTF CIMIC Cell representatives. The later commended local leaders’ work in preventing violent extremism in the area, highlighted their role as key for an effective civil-military cooperation and protection of civilians within their community. After a round of introductions, the leaders shared the strong importance of religion in their communal life and how this has shaped their trust in God as the first source and overall protection. Wandala Sultanate representatives informed that they are actively engaged in the fight against disinformation within their communities in conjunction with the vigilance committees in Mayo Tshanaga area. They informed that Boko Haram activities have destroyed socio-economic life and restoration of security in the environment would go along with restoring business opportunities in the area as it was before.

Local leaders described how vigilante committees in villages represent an important source of early warning to prevent and respond to incident, in coordination with security forces present in the area. They also mentioned the need to better equip and support vigilance committees in terms of boots and torches. In addition, community leaders in the Wandala Sultanate were also given the opportunity to reflect on the security situation with the multinational joint force. The leaders mentioned that after the death of Cheikau, the number of defections has increased. Therefore, the challenge of reintegrating people who returned to the community is representing a huge challenge. They raised a lot of security suspicions and discontentment at the community level. They also indicated that the internally-displaced persons present in the area need more assistance. They recognized that security forces are conducting lots of patrols and do their best to protect, but indicated that it was not enough, more needed to be done.
Building trust between security forces and communities. The CIMIC Advisor supported by his team has a role to build trust between security forces and communities. According to the 2017 UNDP Report, ‘Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives and the Tipping Point for Recruitment,’ 71 percent of over 500 former recruits of violent extremist groups in Africa indicated that government action, including traumatic incidents involving state security forces, provided the immediate reason for joining. Examples of such incidents in the Lake Chad Basin, include revenge for brutality, poor discipline among military officers and human rights abuses such as intimidation, extortion, destruction of property, dragnet arrests or unlawful killings of loved ones. Literature and field research alike demonstrate that Boko Haram has exploited and compounded such incidents in its propaganda against state authorities and security forces. In addition to coordination and communication structures between military and civilians, as mentioned later in this study, putting the two actors in joint activities is crucial to rebuilding the social contract between security forces and communities.

In Chad, the National Window organized in various JAP localities, notably in Guite, Baltram, Ngalam and Koulkime many football games between community youth and the local security force units. Such competitions have contributed to the dissipation of mistrust and opening of channels of communication and normalizing relations.

A security force representative receiving a trophy from the facilitator of a training on CIMIC and Human Rights in Guite, a JAP location in Chad.
In the same vein on Community engagement, at the regional level, the Regional CIMIC Advisor and MNJTF Chief J9, in close coordination with the four Sectors, conducted medical outreach missions in Mora (Sector 1) on 13 July, Diffa (Sector 3) on 26 July, Munguno (Sector 4) on 20 August and Bagasola (Sector 2) on 24 August 2021, as part of Quick Impact Projects. Funded by the United Kingdom, the medical outreach gathered local leaders, women, men and youth. National, local and regional media participated in the medical outreach, which resulted in great interactions between local populations and MNJTF at sector level.

At the end of the project, the LCBC-MNJTF CIMIC Cell closely monitored CIMIC activities in the sectors. The medical outreach organized between July and August 2021 gave a momentum to CIMIC activities at the local level and more related activities were organized by MNJTF Sectors.

Indeed, MNJTF sectors have successfully used football – a unifying game which promotes friendliness and social cohesion among youths – to strengthen civil-military relations. It has to be highlighted, however, that the use of sport is especially helpful if the local community team wins.

In 2022, Community engagement and confidence building between MNJTF and communities has been strengthened. From four Quick Impact Projects in 2021, the CELL coordinated the implementation at least 47 projects from various partners. In addition, a Community Dialogues project through radio programmes has been submitted to a partner and the project is expected to complement the Quick Impact Projects.
2.4. COOPERATION AND COORDINATION

2.4.1. Internal Cooperation Between CIMIC Advisors

Cooperation and coordination between CIMIC advisors of the 4 national windows and the regional window and beyond is important to share information, good practices, work in synergy to enhance civil-military cooperation and address challenges. If the Lake Chad Basin countries have created the Multinational Joint Task Force to work in a coordinated and joint manner to respond to challenges posed by Boko Haram, this underlines the need for actors supporting the riparian countries and their security forces to work in synergy in this area to meet the challenges posed by Boko Haram.

Over the past two years, few meetings took place between CIMIC Advisors of National Stabilization Windows (Chad, Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria), with the participation of an African Union Humanitarian Liaison Officer and Head of National Stabilization Windows, to exchange information, lessons learned and possibilities to implement jointly cross-border projects. The first virtual regional meeting held in February 2021 dedicated to Civil-Military Cooperation in the context of the implementation of the Stabilization Strategy provided a great opportunity to CIMIC Advisors to know each other; undertake a global overview exercise on current activities on civil-military cooperation and share ideas for joint work and integrated approach, as underlined in the Stabilization Strategy. However, this coordination structure, which was a promising initiative remained informal. A new formal structure is under development combining Lake Chad Basin and Liptako Gourma regional stabilization programmes.

2.4.2. Cooperation and coordination with communities

Establishing coordination platforms remains an essential element of the success of CIMIC Advisor work both at national and regional levels. It has proved to be an effective tool for joint planning and implementation of activities.

At the territorial level, in Maiduguri, Nigeria, for example, the CIMIC Advisor works with the Security Planning and Coordination Group (SPCG), a structure which has been established to support coordinated actions to improve community security and rule of law. SPCG is a facility-specific mechanism under the aegis of the Governor of each territorial state and acts as a working group of the State Security Council. Its purpose is to support implementation of lower-level JAPs through planning on how improvements in security will be delivered; advise and de-conflict roles, functions and priorities for each security actor; establish coordination arrangements that should exist; and identify key capacity constraints of each actor to fulfill its mandate. The SPCG includes representatives from the territorial state’s critical functions.

SPCG effectively coordinates infrastructure projects with the UNDP and security actors in JAP areas. So, although it primarily supports and implements infrastructure development for the deployment of law enforcement and border control agencies, it can also sponsor CIMIC work to strengthen defensive constructions like trenches and perimeter walls around communities. Similar mechanisms can be found in other national windows at department or province state level.
In addition, at a lower level, UNDP have supported JAP communities to create Community Stabilization Committees (CSC), a forum inspired by community policing best practices. The Community Stabilization Committees aims to promote community safety and security and to have open dialogue on priority community safety and security concerns with security actors. The Community Stabilization Committees represents the community, and the forum meets regularly. It does not need to be attended by the CIMIC Advisor each time, but the CIMIC Advisor should not be a stranger to its meetings and must attend as many times as possible once it has been established.

In Nigeria National Window, there is an additional layer, which is the Community Security Groups (CSGs). CSGs have been established, consisting of senior officers of each military/law enforcement/civil security agency operating in that specific location. These meetings directly follow tactical level Community Stabilization Committee meetings which are attended by twenty-five local community representatives, as well as the aforementioned security services. The idea is that the Community Stabilization Committees discusses general security concerns within the community, and the CSG then meets confidentially to discuss how such issues should be addressed. The CSG can then both inform the Community Stabilization Committees as well as their senior leadership at the State level of any developments within their specific community, creating a holistic security feedback loop which develops greater resilience at all decision-making levels.

“In Banki, the Borno State Government via the Ministry for Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Resettlement, the Nigerian Armed Forces, the Nigerian Police Force, Nigerian Customs Service and Nigerian Immigration Service, UNDP and the Banki Community Stabilization Committees all worked together to build the infrastructure to win the peace. From the digging of trenches, building of perimeter walls, construction of law enforcement offices and accommodation and the lighting of WASH facilities, especially for women, we were able to enhance security to the level where over 130 shops could be re-built as well as new housing complexes. Community surveys indicate that perceptions of security have improved and cross border trade with Cameroon is flourishing. The deployment of an additional 60 police officers to the town has been particularly welcomed.”

CIMIC Advisor, Nigeria

In Cameroon National Window, in Maroua, this engagement through the Community Stabilization Committees led to the procurement of basic equipment to GSAs to ensure that they can conduct their ‘24/7’ security function. Bicycles, flashlights, identifying vests/armband, mobile phones and binoculars were provided.

In Chad, the research documented that in addition to Community Stabilization Committees, specific Civil-Military Cooperation Cells have been created in seven JAP locations to reinforce civil-military interactions notably in Guite, Balzam, Ngalamia, Kouikine, Mitterine, Bol and Bagasola.
This localization of CIMIC structures is particularly interesting in the sense that they have received the consent of local authorities. Baltram Deputy Chief of Administration, for example, suggested that he will make available a piece of land for the civilian and military representative of the Cell for farming activities, while UNDP National Window will provide seeds, equipment and necessary technical support to the team to develop their activities. This initiative is yet to produce results; however, it demonstrates strong interest of local communities for enhanced civil-military cooperation and the potential impact the role of the CIMIC Advisor can have. In an area with a long history of security forces' violations, civilian and security forces sitting in a dialogue structure and working together to improve livelihood is a good example of CIMIC work at the local level.

At the regional level, through the RSS governing structures, the LCBC-MNJTF CIMIC Cell has been established in N'Djamena, Chad. The CIMIC Cell is one of the governing structures of the RSS and contains military and civilian personnel from the LCBC, MNJTF, Africa Union and other stakeholders interested in supporting MNJTF on CIMIC. Terms of reference have been developed by the CIMIC Advisor. A comprehensive and inclusive consultation then followed before its validation during a workshop. The Terms of reference were then endorsed by LCBC Executive Secretary, which gave the Cell a strong political support. The day-to-day management of the CIMIC Cell has been the responsibility of the Regional CIMIC Advisor, in close coordination with the MNJTF Chief J9 and African Union Humanitarian Officer, a civilian staff supporting MNJTF. The African Union has been a vivid actor in CIMIC by leveraging its combined political advantage and resources contributed by international donors to support MNJTF CIMIC objectives. Meetings take place usually at MNJTF Conference Rooms, or at LCBC headquarters. CIMIC Cell members work collaboratively and ensure all relevant issues are discussed and coordinated and that appropriate civilian oversight of MNJTF CIMIC activities is undertaken, due to frequent rotation of Staff Officers and lack of institutional memory.

The CIMIC Cell also ensures the implementation of key principles such as “do no harm,” humanitarian principles, human-rights-based approach, gender mainstreaming in programming and activities and local ownership.

Two years of building partnerships and collaborating with MNJTF and other implementing partners through the Cell has led to the development of some key strategic documents and the development of important initiatives which strengthened coordination between the MNJTF, Stabilization and humanitarian actors in the region. The Cell has also facilitated several capacity-building sessions for the MNJTF in recognized institutions in Africa, including

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18 The “Do no harm” principle is a concept which is well anchored into development and humanitarian interventions. Michael Brzeska and Hans-Georg Ehrhart, in their Policy Paper 30 titled “Civil-Military Cooperation in Post Conflict Rehabilitation and Reconstruction" underlines the fact that this principle means refraining from taking any action which could be harmful to civilian aid workers, military personnel, or the local population.

19 Women have an important role to play in peacebuilding, as recognized by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325 (2000), 2122 (2013) and 2242 (2015) on Women, Peace and Security. The strengthening of community safety and security should particularly benefit women and girls.

20 Local ownership ensures the sustainability of peacebuilding efforts. It is now widely recognized that inclusive local ownership is relevant in all contexts – from prevention to post conflict peacebuilding. The success of prevention and peacebuilding efforts, and especially their sustainability, are understood to be closely linked with the degree to which such efforts are locally owned. In the context of post conflict work, it has been recognized that peace cannot be imposed from outside but must be genuinely and gradually built by a process of accommodation on the part of domestic stakeholders, public and private. Reducing the likelihood of violence or managing outbreaks of violent conflict and emerging from it with the minimum cost to lives and livelihoods, requires adopting a strategic or forward-looking approach to institutionalizing prevention into community and national structures, strengthening local and national capacities and processes and improving dialogue and mediation skills.
training on Protection of Civilians in armed conflict, Gender protection in armed conflict, DDR, as well as Weapons and Ammunition Management. Within the last two years, the Cell has facilitated the development of a Strategic Communication Strategy for Prevention of Violent Extremism for MNJTF, supported collaboration between MNJTF and United Nations Department of Peace Operations on a study on Weapons and Ammunitions Management in the Lake Chad Basin. The current study is also part of policy documents led by the cell. The Cell also facilitated, in April 2021, a specific workshop dedicated to identifying priority cross-border interventions in line with the implementation of the Regional Stabilization Strategy. The LCBC-MNJTF CIMIC Cell developed strategies and activities to build confidence with communities, get their support and thus prevent violent extremism. In 2021, medical outreach missions were conducted in Mora (Sector 1), Diffa (Sector 3), Munguno (Sector 4) and Bagasola (Sector 2). Funded by the United Kingdom, the medical outreach gathered local leaders, women, men and youth. Local, national and regional media participated in the medical outreach, which resulted in great interactions between local populations and MNJTF at sector level. The establishment of the Cell has also facilitated collaboration between different partners supporting the MNJTF, including increased information exchange.

More recently, the Cell has initiated an effort to review and update MNJTF CIMIC SOP to reflect the changing and dynamic nature of MNJTF CIMIC-related activities and to standardize MNJTF civil-military-related efforts within a common operational procedure and standards. In November 2022, a capacity-building workshop on Civil-Military Cooperation took place for MNJTF Officers from Sectors and HQ, with the participation of humanitarian and development actors, and a new SOP to strengthen civil-military cooperation in MNJTF areas of operation were developed.

The impact of the CIMIC Cell has been highlighted by an MNJTF Force Commander, as noted in the box on the right.

### 2.4.3 Collaboration with humanitarian actors

UNDP strongly recommends the CIMIC Advisor to formally engage with humanitarian organizations operating in the area. Therefore, establishing effective relationships and communication with other Humanitarian Heads, UN-CMCoord Officers and Security focal points of agencies is a good practice to highlight. Indeed, humanitarian agencies have years of experience in their field and perhaps in the area and their advice and support should be sought. They are likely to find interest in the CIMIC Advisors’ approach and objectives. This dialogue will be helpful in terms of sharing questions of distinction of CIMIC activities with humanitarian activities. To ensure a good understanding between stabilization and humanitarian actors, it is critical that UNDP CIMIC colleagues engage with UN-CMCoord colleagues regularly and bilaterally to share concerns, information and minimise the risk of confusion.

As the Regional Stabilization Strategy builds on the Humanitarian-Development and Peace nexus, the CIMIC Advisor should therefore formally and routinely provide a brief on the work of the UNDP JAP implementation so that humanitarian agencies understand what progress is being made, as the ultimate goal of stabilization is to help communities to move from humanitarian interventions to recovery so that they can take care of themselves.

In a related development, Humanitarian and security forces have prejudices and concerns about each other sometimes. Often this stems from prejudices or outdated situations and can become unhelpful ‘myths’ that hinder

“(...) Non-kinetic successes recorded in 2021 came from broader partnership that has been created since the establishment of the Civil-Military Cooperation Cell. (...) Some of the key activities that have yielded positive results include the community dialogue which was facilitated through medical outreach.”

Major-General Abdul Khalifa Ibrahim, MNJTF Force Commander
cooperation and trust. The CIMIC Advisor has a role to play in challenging these prejudices and demystifying them. Humanitarian and security actors have much experience they can share. If they understand each other better, they can work together better on the ground. From information collected, security forces indicated that many humanitarian actors are keen to assess security actors on gender-based violence and human rights, but less keen to listen to security actors’ concerns or recommendations, whereas humanitarian actors insist on the fact that independence, neutrality and impartiality are some basic operating principles and, therefore, cannot be working with political objectives or working with a party to the conflict. The CIMIC Advisor, while participating in UN-CMCoord meetings or in other fora, should play a positive role as an important actor working to stabilize the area.

In Cameroon for example, the CIMIC Advisor has engaged in a regular monthly OCHA-sponsored dialogue with the MNJTF sector and national security forces. Through meetings, parties exchange information on common interests and clarify certain situations in relation to the activities implemented by humanitarian workers, especially in the areas of military operations. The dialogues and training are particularly useful to ensure communication and understanding, and to build relationships.

In Maiduguri, the UNDP CIMIC Advisor has built a great working relationship with UN-CMCoord in Maiduguri, a former British Military Colonel. The CIMIC Advisor informed that they meet once a week, to keep each other apprised of each other’s work. They discuss access to communities and security forces in various locations in order to make plans and advocate accordingly.

At the Regional level as well, the Regional CIMIC Advisor used to participate in UN-CMCoord meetings. Even though the meeting was limited to activities in Chad and Cameroon borders, it was an entry point for more engagement at regional level. The engagement with humanitarian actors in Chad was done through regular updates and exchanges of information, notably on the role and responsibilities of the LCBC-MNJTF CIMIC Cell and the specific work of CIMIC Advisor in stabilization.
III. Other good practices and lessons in CIMIC Advisor work

3.1. CAPACITY BUILDING INITIATIVES

Capacity building is an activity which has been undertaken across the region by CIMIC Advisors. It has been a task delivered by or through CIMIC Advisors. Indeed, the CIMIC Advisor, selected carefully for the environment and role, has a lot to offer. Transfer of that knowledge and skills in simple and easily comprehensible form is very important, given the transitory nature of the JAP model, it is equally important in an environment where turnover of staff is high and staff gaps can be left unfilled.

In the Cameroon National Window, the CIMIC Advisor worked with human rights organizations to provide human rights training to security forces and judicial actors. The CIMIC team also built capacities through a partnership established with local inspection units and the prosecutor’s offices. Its operating principle is that to enable a fairer and equitable justice system, a basic level of security must be achieved. From this, other interventions can follow that contribute to enhancing trust and rebuilding the social contract, between Cameroonian authorities and communities.

Immediate stabilization in the Lac and Hadjer Lamis Provinces covers twelve (12) Joint Action Plans (JAPs), four of which have been operational since the pilot phase of the project.

In order to contribute to the improvement of security and the well-being of communities, the project team facilitated and accompanied the establishment of four (4) stabilization committees in Guite, Baltram, Ngalamia and Koulikîme, whose prerogatives were to organize dialogue between the communities themselves on the one hand, and between the communities and the security forces on the other. This dialogue consisted of setting up and sustaining the security coordination mechanism, with a view to developing the early warning system. This early warning system is managed by the stabilization committees and supervised by the Community Liaison Assistants in the two provinces, with the aim of strengthening the security mechanisms through community relays collaborating with the security forces on possible incursions of armed groups into the communities. Some important results of the socio-security dialogue activities in the Lac and Hadjer Lamis Provinces include the strengthening of trust and peaceful cohabitation between the security forces, the administrative authorities and the civilian population, the improvement of inter and intra-community and inter-corporate social cohesion, the establishment and operationalization of joint civil-military committees to prevent and transform this mistrust into permanent dialogue.

Ali Fofana, Area Coordinator, Chad National Window
Training and capacity building on human rights, sexual and gender-based violence, conflict prevention and resolution and civil-military cooperation workshops took place several times in Chad’s JAP locations. These training programmes involved key stakeholders within and around the JAP community, notably security forces, administrative, religious, judicial and traditional authorities and civil society actors. Group work on the relationship between security forces and populations made it possible to establish a diagnosis of the sources of mistrust and conflicts between them and identify mechanisms to address them. A series of workshops organized in November 2021 concluded with participants signing an “Act of Engagement” in favour of enhanced Civil-Military Cooperation, respect for human rights and fight against gender-based violence. This kind of workshop enables dialogue, creates common understanding of the roles and responsibilities of each stakeholder, establishes the bases of relationships of trust and helps facilitate the strategic and operational management of community security. The adoption of an “Act of Engagement” with the list of participants and their signature is particularly significant as it highlights local community commitment for better cooperation and collaboration.

In Nigeria National Window, an intervention in the border town of Gamboru-Ngala is indicative of the holistic, community based and capacity building initiatives that CIMIC Advisors implement. Ngala has witnessed a significant improvised Explosive Device (IED) threat and suffers from the presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO) in the vicinity. This, tragically, resulted in the loss of children’s lives when they began playing with an explosive that they had found. The Nigerian CIMIC Advisors planned an initiative with UNMAS, non-governmental organizations, international government representatives, the Nigerian Police Force, the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps, the Nigerian Army and the Ngala Community Stabilization Committee to increase awareness, strengthen resilience and build capacity to mitigate IED/UXO threats.

Similarly, an important mandate of the CIMIC Cell at the regional level is to facilitate training and capacity building sessions for MNJTF. Mid-2021, the CIMIC Cell facilitated a Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre mission to N’Djamena, Chad, to conduct a Training Needs Assessment of the MNJTF. The assessment identified specific gaps and recommended MNJTF to develop a training policy document which will include training coordination for the headquarters and various sectors. The mission recommended a common ground to enable the MNJTF with its differing military cultures (Anglophone and Francophone) to work seamlessly, a gender policy document and a pre-deployment training guide for Troop Contributing Countries. The recommendations are yet to be implemented, but the support given to the MNJTF have identified clear aspects for improvements on capacities and human resources.
3.2 CROSS-BORDER INITIATIVES

The Regional CIMIC Advisor and his colleagues in national windows have made efforts to communicate and develop joint activities. Given the geography and different challenges across the regions, cross-border engagement and initiatives have been bi-lateral in nature. There were situations where bi-lateral collaboration was undertaken, particularly within areas where a regular threat to a community in country ‘A’ emanates from country ‘B’, for example cross-border raiding, or where cross-border security force operations take place. Regular contacts with fellow CIMIC Advisors helped them to perform their roles better.

The Nigerian CIMIC Advisors played a significant role in initiatives at the border of Banki/Amchide. At the state level, this involved working with comptrollers of the Nigerian Immigration Service and the Nigerian Customs Service to determine future personnel levels in that location, considering projected increases in the number of inhabitants within the community. It also involved securing land for the provision of infrastructure support to those agencies and working with engineering teams to determine the most appropriate designs for barracks and offices. Once deployments were increased and the border fully reopened, the CIMIC Advisors worked with the military to facilitate escorts for trade vehicles moving from Amchide, through Banki and onto the trading hub of Maiyuguri. To ensure best practice at the border, Customs and immigration officers were also invited to attend a week-long course on Code of Conduct, Human Rights Awareness and the prevention of Gender and Sexual Based Violence. Feedback from the respective Comptrollers and all personnel who attended the course was extremely positive.

3.3 GENDER MAINSTREAMING: FROM BENEFICIARIES TO CHANGE-MAKERS

Gender issues are at the heart of the crisis around Lake Chad and are central to its sustainable resolution. Pillar 9 of the Regional Stabilization Strategy calls for specific actions to combat sexual and gender-based violence and for a gender-sensitive approach to be mainstreamed into all responses. Women have an important role to play in peacebuilding, as recognized by United Nations Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000), 2122 (2013) and 2242 (2015) on women and peace and security.

At the regional level, during the implementation of the CIMIC Cell work plan, considerations were given to gender issues. CIMIC Cell meetings have seen the effective participation of female military and police staff and gender issues have been discussed on various occasions. Still at the strategic level, the KAIPTC Training Needs Assessment of MNJTF recommended a Gender Policy document to guice female representation within MNJTF. At the operational level, men and women were equally beneficiaries in MNJTF sectors of the medical outreach and significant number of women participated in handover ceremonies. Dialogues were also attended by women, except in Mora, Cameroon, where all participants were men, due to the configuration of the Wandalale Sultanate. However, gender considerations were raised during discussions and local religious and community leaders acknowledged that women and children were severely affected by the Boko Haram crisis.

“Women and girls are hit hard by conflict. My role is to present their concerns and issues to the committee, where good recommendations can be proposed to address their concerns. The committee helps us look out for each other and helps us to highlight the important security issues women and girls face. We’re now working together to rebuild a strong and stable community.”

Nigerian businesswoman, Banki Community Stabilization Committees member and former refugee
At the National Window level, the study revealed strong efforts made to take into consideration gender issues. For example, during capacity building and civil-military dialogue activities from 22 to 24 November 2021 in Guite (Hadjer Lamis Province), 47 participants including 4 women leaders participated in the dialogue. From 25 to 27 November 2021, a similar dialogue took place in Karal (Hadjer Lamis Province) where 40 people, including two women participated in the session in Karal.

A leadership role was given to women during the civil-military dialogue in Guite, as a woman participant was in charge to facilitate a group discussion, as well as drafting and reading the “Act of Engagement.” At the end of the two workshops, participants committed themselves to a continued and permanent respect for human rights, civil-military dialogue, the fight against sexual and gender-based violence. Even though women were underrepresented in the Guite workshop, the leadership role given by the CIMIC Advisor is a significant good practice for women empowerment at the local level, where they are marginalized. From their status of usual beneficiaries, the leadership role given to women enable them to play a key role as change-makers.

Other similar workshops took place in other locations. From 14 to 24 March 2022, four workshops were organized in four (4) JAP locations in Baga Soia, Boi, Guite and Baltram, on Human Rights, Conflict Prevention and Resolution as well as CIMIC. 174 participants attended, including 19 women and 71 security forces’ representatives. Strong emphasis was put on women participation and their role in the workshop. The implementation of these training programmes involved a strong collaboration between Chad National Window and the Regional CIMIC Advisor, which also constitutes a good practice between National and Regional windows.

In the same vein, the Nigerian CIMIC Advisors constantly advocate for increasing opportunities and deployments for female officers within the military and law enforcement agencies. This has resulted in some marked successes. Borno State ‘Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps’ undertook a pre-deployment training programme for field officers which was balanced at approximately 50/50 between male and female candidates. In addition, within the infrastructure support framework, projected deployments of male/female officers to JAP locations and infrastructure have been taken into consideration and, accordingly, separate accommodation and wash facilities for female personnel were made.

Over the past months, 750 military and law enforcement personnel in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States, in all of the JAP locations, were trained on Human Rights Awareness and the prevention of Sexual and Gender Based Violence. Members of the Nigerian Bar Association and the Nigerian Human Rights Commission were also in attendance to ensure that field officers, Gender Desk Officers for the security services and legal practitioners all received the same messaging.

3.4 ENSURING STRONG COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES ON CIMIC

Stabilization is enabled by regular truthful information. Communities in remote areas acquire their information as best they can. Violent extremist groups work very hard to provide a false narrative and gossip does the rest. CIMIC efforts can be significantly undermined if a community receives false or little information. Similarly, strong communication and information strategies help to change the narrative on the Lake Chad Basin region, share opportunities for more interactions between stakeholders and create interest in RSS themes within local communities. Communicating through pamphlets, community meetings, radio, TV and social media in local languages should be another dimension in the CIMIC work. Indeed, the use of social media, such as Twitter and YouTube should be used, after receiving the appropriate support and clearance from the Communication specialist and the Head of the Programme, to widely disseminate CIMIC activities beyond the area where the activity took place, as Boko Haram uses mostly social media to disseminate their propaganda. Within this framework, counter-narrative messages and programmes should be developed taking into consideration the sources of their false narratives.
For example, during the medical and dialogue outreach in MNJT Sectors in 2021, the involvement of local, national and regional media into the missions gave the opportunity to reach local communities beyond the areas where the activities took place and disseminate information on MNJT Civil-Military Cooperation activities and efforts. Radio Ndarason International, a radio based in N'Djamena and broadcasting in local languages across the region, had a journalist embedded in the mission team across the sectors.

Similarly, the Nigerian CIMIC Advisors realize the benefit of communicating their efforts to all levels, both vertically and horizontally. From the State Governor’s Office, down to senior officers in the field in specific JAP locations, to members of the communities themselves, it has been vital that constant, timely and consolidated messages are sent regarding CIMIC efforts. This has kept all of their interlocutors well informed and enhanced awareness of specific interventions in JAP locations while, at the same time, managing expectations.

CIMIC Advisors can play a pivotal role in developing policies which can impact decision-makers. The Regional CIMIC Advisor has supported MNJT, PVE Team in Addis Ababa and LCBC Commission in the process which has led to the development of a Regional Strategic Communication Plan of Action for the prevention of violent extremism in the Lake Chad Basin. Indeed, in January 2020, the PVE Project Team in Addis Ababa received a request from the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJT) for support in the domain of strategic communication to degrade violent extremist ideologies from ISWAP and JAS in the region. The MNJT Force Commander’s agenda for PVE in 2020 included an inclusive, whole-of-society process to establish alternative means to address Boko Haram ideology through collaborative efforts of military and affected communities. The CIMIC Advisor supported the process by making the link between different actors involved.

In fact, Radio is a good way of reaching the entire population of the Lake Chad Basin because of lack of electricity. Radio is a critical media tool to receive and share information. The Regional CIMIC Advisor has developed a project with Radio Ndarason International (RN) and partners to support dialogue and build trust between communities and MNJT. The project includes a 20-minute radio programme every week for 6 months, with each sector intervening once a month on a chosen topic. The programme aims to feature senior military figures including the Force Commander as well as sector commanders or designated spokespersons in all the four sectors of Mora, Bagasola, Mongoune and Diffa, ideally speaking one of the broadcast languages and responding to questions and concerns from the population.

National, regional and local media strongly participated to MNJT CIMIC Activities in the four sectors.

Radio Ndarason International (RNI) broadcasts on shortwave across the Lake Chad Basin and beyond and on FM in N’Djamena as well as on the eastern side of the Lake in Bol, Baga Sola, Higouri, Doum Deum and Lwa and in Kousseri in local languages.
IV. Next steps and recommendations

The deployment of CIMIC Advisors to the Lake Chad Basin region has had a significantly positive effect on civil-military relations. In the areas where CIMIC Advisors are deployed, there is a growing understanding within security forces of the need to involve more civilian components in the response against Boko Haram. This was not the case before implementation of the stabilization strategy.

However, in a region marked by many socio-economic and security challenges, much remains to be done at all levels to strengthen collaboration between, on the one hand, security forces and local communities to build trust and, on the other hand, security forces and humanitarian and development organization actors. From this perspective, the following recommendations can be made.

4.1. STRENGTHEN COLLABORATION AND DEVELOP A POLICY DOCUMENT TO GUIDE THE ACTIVITIES OF CIMIC ADVISORS: UNDP

Coordination and collaboration between CIMIC Advisors should be strengthened. It will be productive to formally create a platform for exchange, consultation and collaboration among CIMIC and Stabilization Advisors. Such a platform needs to be formalized with the support of the leadership of the stabilization strategy, to make contributions of each CIMIC Advisor an integral part of their work. CIMIC Advisors should not limit their work to the "national window," but rather have a regional and cross-border perspective. In addition, this platform could help to engage MNJT and national army CIMIC officers periodically and therefore strengthen collaboration with national army J9 Officers.

CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION IN THE UNDP STABILIZATION PROGRAMME: TOWARDS A SUITABLE JOB TITLE

Stabilization programming is becoming a critical component of UNDP's support to countries affected by protracted crises or emerging from conflicts. Through lessons learned and good practices from past stabilization work in Iraq and Libya, as well as ongoing programmes in the Lake Chad Basin region and Liptako Gourma, UNDP is developing relevant policies and guidance on a number of aspects related to stabilization. Civil-military relations is one of those components. UNDP engagement with national security forces is a core task in stabilization programming. The initial project document of the Stabilization in Lake Chad Basin programme, developed in August 2019, mentioned “civil-military coordination positions” and “Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Advisers” assigning personnel the responsibility to work with security forces and government-affiliated security actors.

As stabilization is a complex and dynamic process, in the new programme document developed in August 2021, UNDP staff engaging with security actors in the stabilization programme are now designated “Security Forces Liaison Officers.” However, different titles still co-exist. In the Liptako Gourma Stabilization Facility, UNDP staff engaging with security forces are designated by the new terminology, while in the Lake Chad Basin Stabilization programme, different titles are used, such as “Civil-Military Coordination Advisor” in Nigeria, “Civil-Military Cooperation Advisor” at the RSS Secretariat and “Civil-Military Engagement Advisor” in Niger, among others. Thus, one immediate area of work is to harmonize job titles across stabilization programmes for staff working with security forces, which will become more important as stabilization activities expand.
Activities undertaken by advisors engaging security forces include coordination with state authorities and security forces, but also liaison, cooperation, consultation, engagement, planning, mentoring, advising, communicating and many other responsibilities associated with stabilization. All these activities take place with communities, religious leaders, civil society, humanitarian actors, national authorities, women groups, international actors, etc., and not only with security forces as the “Security Forces Liaison Officer” terminology can suggest.

In military jargon, “Liaison Officer” applies to someone whose role is to be an interface between two institutions, forces or commanders, with more or less limited capacity to decide and take responsibility. Therefore, the term “Security Forces Liaison Officer” can have an undesired effect vis-à-vis military counterparts. A civilian staff front of commanders or senior military officers with “liaison roles” might be seen as someone with limited decision-making authority, whereas responsibilities carried out by UNDP staff assuming this function are complex. The positive side of the “Security Forces Liaison Officer” terminology is to make a clear distinction with UN-CMCoord job titles, but it seems not to completely reflect fully the responsibilities of CIMIC staff in the UNDP context as indicated above. Therefore, it will be advisable to continue to reflect and consider a new job title that matches better with the roles and responsibilities of UNDP CIMIC Advisors.

The title “Civil-Military Stabilization Adviser/Specialist/Associate” (depending on the United Nations level for the position) can be explored. This proposed title aims to be specific to UNDP work on stabilization and unify various titles; it highlights the stabilization framework and covers a wide range of activities undertaken by CIMIC Advisors. It may also be worth considering keeping (or re-adopting) “Civil-Military Cooperation Adviser/Specialist/Associate” across all stabilization programmes, because this job title is already well known across military and peacekeeping literature.

The objective of this reflection is to stimulate constructive ideas and contributions.

Furthermore, from the research, it appears useful and important to develop generic guidelines and/or Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) to strengthen and guide CIMIC Advisor work. These guidelines, once reviewed and enriched by the leadership of the Stabilization Strategy, could be adopted and be part of the CIMIC Advisor’s Terms of Reference. A sample of generic guidelines has been proposed at the end of this study.

In a related development, at the regional level, terms of reference (ToR) were developed to establish the joint LCBC-MNJTF Civil-Military Cooperation Cell within MNJTF. The ToR defines the roles and responsibilities of each actor in the cell. Such joint terms of reference should be encouraged at the level of national windows so that CIMIC Advisors have a common vision and strategy with national J9 CIMIC Officers.
4.2. INCREASE RESOURCES AND SUPPORT FOR CIVIL-MILITARY ACTIVITIES.

Stabilization projects have increased over the past three years. At the same time, military operations have sharply reduced the capabilities of Boko Haram and other insurgent groups, and these armed groups have been plagued by internal struggles that further weaken them. This has led to an unprecedented number of fighters and dependents surrendering to authorities in various countries.

The political support shown by governors in October 2021 for civil-military activities during the 3rd Lake Chad Basin Governors' Forum must be translated into greater human and financial resources support to conduct civil-military activities.

Political entities and other decisionmakers should:

- encourage cross-border exchanges by supporting and initiating soft and hard interventions, such as improving regional dialogues among local populations, building and enhancing support to networks of women and youth, open up the most productive areas of the Lake Chad region through road construction and maintaining key rural trails and lake channels, among others; and
- strengthen the effective presence of law enforcement agencies in communities and establish a framework for direct dialogue to allow various actors, including opinion and community leaders, commanders of defense and security forces, government-affiliated security actors, youth, women and economic operators to meet regularly to discuss concerns and find solutions.

4.3. INCREASE CIMIC ACTIVITIES: NATIONAL ARMIES AND MNJTF

At the end of November 2022, an MNJTF capacity building workshop on civil-military cooperation took place. The workshop enhanced capacities of MNJTF on civil-military related concepts, principles and approaches in a conflict context, exposed MNJTF officers to CIMIC strategies and developed a coordination framework, opportunities and benefits between MNJTF and stabilization actors. The workshop led to the draft of a new SOP to strengthen the work of CIMIC officers in MNJTF sectors.

These developments are positive and should improve MNJTF capacities to fulfil the second and third aspects of its mandate, namely, to facilitate the implementation of overall stabilization programmes in the affected areas and humanitarian operations. In that regard, as noted in the MNJTF SOP, the MNJTF HQ should establish Civil-Military Operations Centres (CMOCs) at sector level. The operationalization of CMOCs will turn CIMIC into an integral part of the fight against insurgency. It will increase military contributions to stabilization strategies and activities at the sectoral level. It will also increase trust, early warning and early response, with security forces being proactive in responding to intelligence and information provided by the local population on Boko Haram and other insurgents groups movements.

Sector commanders and LCBC-MNJTF joint CIMIC cells should ensure the dissemination and operationalization of the new CIMIC SOP. It is hoped that these guidelines would inspire national armies to revitalize and strengthen their CIMIC activities.

4.4. DISSEminate OF KNOWLEDGE AND GOOD PRACTICES ON CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION: CIMIC STAKEHOLDERS

A Knowledge Management Platform has been established by the Regional Stabilization Secretariat at LCBC and it will serve three purposes: (1) as the go-to resource for news and information on all aspects of stabilization, recovery and development efforts around Lake Chad; (2) as a repository for assessment reports, lessons learned and good practices, both regional and global; and (3) as a dynamic tool for coordination and the networking of practitioners. A civil-military cooperation window has been created for the benefit of all CIMIC practitioners. Therefore, CIMIC Advisors and security actors should use the knowledge management platform put in place by the Stabilization Secretariat to disseminate knowledge, lessons learned and create a Community of Practice on civil-military cooperation.
V. Conclusion

This study has explored and highlighted good practices and lessons on civil-military cooperation over two years of work by CIMIC Advisors deployed at the regional and national window level for the implementation of the LCBC Stabilization Strategy. Based on data collected and processed through different methods, several good practices have been recorded, lessons have been identified in the process of implementing activities to enhance civil-military cooperation and collaboration for sustainable stabilization.

Strong cooperation and collaboration between military and civilian actors are critical for the success of stabilization activities. To be able to provide a minimum of social service and infrastructure to the local population and immediate livelihood opportunities in these areas targeted by stabilization programming, minimum security conditions and trust among civilian and security forces are required. The CIMIC Advisor’s role is to support and facilitate this process of connecting various actors to work in the same direction, especially between security forces and civilians. The Advisor’s work should remain dynamic due to the evolving and changing nature of the terrain.

The study has underlined the fact that CIMIC Advisors operate in a dynamic and complex security, political and geographic environment. It requires them to be fully aware of these dynamics and to take into consideration the regional impact of local issues. The deployment of CIMIC Advisors has increased civil-military interactions in areas targeted by the stabilization programme, and these new and positive developments should be sustained. Some recommendations have been formulated in that regard. A new dynamic in civilian-military cooperation by security forces should be developed by civilian actors, MNJTF and national armies, as military operations have made significant progress in weakening the number and offensive capacities of Boko Haram and other insurgent groups.
**Annexes**

**ANNEX 1: GENERIC GUIDELINES**

**Understanding the general context**

- Develop a strong understanding of the political and security context, regional developments, conflict drivers, ways to mitigate harm to populations and identify key actors.
- Develop a good engagement approach, as well as an efficient collaboration and coordination strategy.
- Analyses, jointly with national and regional security forces security in the JAP locations.
- To the extent possible, monitor national security strategies, military plans and assess security implications and risks for stabilization projects.
- Build local intelligence to improve conflict analysis for stabilization programmes to be more adaptive and conflict sensitive and to ensure timely communication and appropriate engagement of security forces.
- Utilize local capacities and resources when/where appropriate.

**Engagement with the military and government-affiliated security actors**

- Understand the military structure and hierarchy in place.
- Where appropriate, establish a Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Cell, engage and strengthen the one in place.
- Liaises continuously with relevant security forces, local authorities and communities on security related matters, in line with the government commitment to ensure security in proposed sites.
- Where possible, emphasize you pursue the same goal: achieving stability.
- Be careful about taking pictures and always ask and stand ready to explain why a particular photo is important.
- Consider allowing some time to build a relationship of trust before going into the core of the issue or asking hard questions.
- However firmly a message needs to be delivered, respect and courtesy are always imperative.
- Avoid bluntly saying ‘no’. Try to offer alternatives that are feasible for all parties.
- Senior ranking military officers should never be undermined or confronted in front of their subordinates.
- Be sure to deal with the correct military branch for the issue at hand or information to gather.
- Be aware of gender issues, women still tend to be grossly underrepresented in the military. Female team members should therefore be prepared, empowered and supported.
- Be aware of government-affiliated security actors (Civilian Joint Task Force in Nigeria (CJTF), Volontaires pour la defense de la patrie (VDP) in Burkina Faso, or ‘vigilantes’ or self-defense armed groups’ in other countries and carefully develop engagement in coordination with national security forces and UNDP leadership and relevant guiding principles.

**Engagement with civilian actors**

- Participate in structured and regular information sharing and early warning mechanisms through involvement with communities, including women, considering their particular security threats and concerns.
- Facilitates coordination between security forces and the community. At the strategic level, develop joint terms of reference which can guide your work with the military and police. - Get the political buy-in.
- Engage with all relevant actors for effective security liaison in JAP locations.
- Empower communities to develop community orientated security solutions (using tools like Conflict Analysis).
- Ensure coherence and consistency in messaging when interacting with community, humanitarian and security force actors. Understand and engage with communications campaigns.
Humanitarian actors

- Maintain links with humanitarian actors, attending UN-CMCoord meetings whenever possible, nurturing bilateral relations with UN-CMCoord Officers as well as Protection and other humanitarian clusters and sectors as appropriate.
- Respect other agencies’ (particularly humanitarian agencies) different mandates and their ways of doing business.
- During coordination activities, consistently emphasize the different nature of liaison and cooperation with security forces vis-à-vis humanitarian UN-CMCoord.
- Engage with UN-CMCoord colleagues regularly and bilaterally to share concerns and information and minimize the risk of confusion.
- Understand differences of humanitarian and stabilization actors’ engagement with security forces.

Internal and external networking

- Act as a conduit and share information with fellow CIMIC Advisors; and share understanding with other CIMIC actors about your organization’s overall strategy and your CIMIC approach.
- Establish effective, formal relationships and communications channels early with all.
- Build and use networks, in accordance with country or other guidelines.
- In regions where opportunities exist for regional cooperation, cross-border initiatives should be pursued.
- Work closely with UNDSS Security Specialists and be aware of their role and responsibilities in assessing the security situation and supporting missions.

Interpersonal skills matter

- Be humble but clear about what each can do to enable yourself and how you can enable their efforts to succeed.
- Do not underestimate individuals because of their role/titles.
- Interact with respect, knowledge of respective roles, trust and transparency and be aware of cultural aspects.
- Focus on building trust through a patient approach. Aim to develop a relationship with these colleagues based on reciprocal basis.
- Promote local ownership when building local capacity.
- Act with integrity and transparency.
## ANNEX 2: COMMUNITY ASSISTANTS DEPLOYMENTS IN CHAD NATIONAL WINDOW

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCES</th>
<th>JAP STATION</th>
<th>N°</th>
<th>POSITIONS</th>
<th>OBSERVATIONS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HADJER LAMIS</td>
<td>GUITÉ</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Community Assistant</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Community Assistant</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MITERINE</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Community Assistant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BALTRAM</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Community Assistant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Community Assistant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Community Assistant</td>
<td>Coordinator of Community Assistant in Hadjer Lamis Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAC</td>
<td>BOL</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Community Assistant</td>
<td>Appointed at the Governorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TCHOUKOUBOUL</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Community Assistant</td>
<td>No Community assistant recruited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DABOUA</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Community Assistant</td>
<td>No Community assistant so far</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KOULKIME</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Community Assistant</td>
<td>Coordinator of Community Assistants activities in Kaya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Community Assistant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Community Assistant</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Community Assistant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NGALAMIA</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Community Assistant</td>
<td>Coordinator of National Window activities in Mamdi departement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Community Assistant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>17</td>
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<td></td>
<td>BAGASOLA</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Community Assistant</td>
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## ANNEX 3 - DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document</th>
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<tr>
<td>Acte d’Engagement GUITE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acte d’Engagement KARAL</td>
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<tr>
<td>Analysis of UNDSS Reported Security Incidents in Far Northern Region Jan-Mar 21</td>
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<tr>
<td>A New Approach to Stabilization Security inside Cameroon’s Far Northern Region – a Proposal (May 21, UNDP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>A Security Analysis for Stabilization of Cameroon’s Far Northern Region (Apr 21) – UNDP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Banki (JAP) Security Plan (Mar 21) – UNDP Nigeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN-CMC Coord Extreme Training–North Cameroon, Maroua (June 21) – UNDP/OCHA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Community Dialogues Focused on Improving the Security Framework (Mar 21) – UNDP Cameroon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comprehensive Report on Civil–Military Cooperation by the Joint LCBC-MNJTF CIMIC Cell (December 2020-September 2021)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consultation workshop for civilian and military administrative officers as well as the civil society of the province for the prioritization and validation of interventions to prevent VE. Bagassola, from 01 to 02 June 2021.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO CIMIC Handbook (Feb 21)</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;No room for dialogue&quot;: How abuses by Niger’s foreign-funded army derail its anti-jihadist fight” The New Humanitarian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operationalizing the Humanitarian-Development Nexus through the Human Security Approach – Annex A. Programme Proposal (UNDP Cameroon)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organization of an awareness campaign (prevention of VE) for the reconciliation between civilian and military populations. Terms of reference</td>
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<td>‘Organization of an awareness campaign for the reconciliation between civilian and military populations’ document</td>
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<td>PRODOC Security Activities (UNDP Cameroon)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protection and Security Analysis for JAP#5 – UNDP Cameroon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional Strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience (RSS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Report of the Capacity Building Workshop for the Security Forces (FS) and civilian actors, with a view to sensitizing them on civil-military cooperation and building confidence in Hadjer Lamis Province in KARAL from 25 to 27 November 2021</td>
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<td>Report of the Capacity Building Workshop for the Security Forces (FS) and civilian actors, with a view to sensitizing them on civil-military cooperation and building confidence in Hadjer Lamis Province in Guité from 22 to 24 November 2021</td>
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<td>Report on community dialogues organized during medical outreach in MNJTF sectors</td>
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<td>Report on the 3rd Meeting of the Lake Chad Basin Governor’s Forum of the Lake Chad Basin Commission</td>
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<td>RSS CIMIC Advisor Debrief Note on Regional Meeting on CIMIC – Feb 21</td>
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<td>RSS Newsletter – Volume 1, March 21</td>
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<tr>
<td>‘Spike in Militant Islamist Violence in Africa Underscores Shifting Security Landscape’ paper</td>
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<td>‘Sustainable development and financing in developing and least developed countries: The important role of Development Finance Institutions and Official Development Assistance’</td>
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<td>Terms of Reference for the LCBC-MNJTF Civil-Military Cooperation Cell for the Regional Stabilization Strategy (01 March 2022)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Terms of Reference – Consultant to develop a study on RSS-RSF CIMIC Activities Lessons Learned and Best Practices</td>
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<td>Terms of Reference – NE Nigeria Security Planning and Coordination Groups</td>
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<td>Tetra Tech UNDP RSF MTE Report (Oct 2021)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thematic Pillars “CIMIC – How to?”</td>
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<td>Resource</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom Government’s Approach to Stabilization</td>
<td>UN-CMCORD Field Handbook vs1.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP – AWP21-RSF-(Cameroon) Project Document</td>
<td>UNDP – A post Boko Haram/JAS Future (May 21)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP Brochure for Far Northern Region State Governor UNDP Donors</td>
<td>UNDP Cameroon Brochure for Donors Meeting Mar 21</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP Cameroon CIMIC Advisor Note to MNJTF Commander: ‘Building Trust in a Community’</td>
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<td>‘UNDP Civil-Military Stabilization Advisor’ presentation</td>
<td>UNDP ‘Conflict Analysis’ Questionnaire for JAP communities (May 21)</td>
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<td>UNDP RSF Project Document (August 2019)</td>
<td>UNDP Stabilization Brief – (December 2021)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP Strategic Plan, 2022-2025</td>
<td>UNHCR – Emergency Handbook ‘Civil-military Coordination’</td>
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<td>United Nations Policy Civil-Military Coordination in United Nations integrated Peacekeeping Missions (UN-CIMIC)</td>
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## ANNEX 4: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

PRIOR TO OR DURING THIS STUDY, THE FOLLOWING PERSONS WERE ENGAGED TO MAKE INPUTS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Interviewee appointment and location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abdoul Nasser</td>
<td>Cameroon – UNDP Prog strategic advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aboubacar Ibrahim</td>
<td>Former CIMIC focal point NIGER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adam Mahamat Boukar</td>
<td>Former (?) CIMIC Focal Point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Fofana</td>
<td>Area Coordinator CHAD (Hadjer Lamis) – National Window</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amy Glass</td>
<td>Head of Programme Support, Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ansciaire Aveved PhD</td>
<td>LCBC-UNDP Consultant on SPRR (Triage, Poursuites, Rehabilitation et Reintegration)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antoine Mbebi</td>
<td>DRSN/EN Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aziza Albachir</td>
<td>Head of Stabilization, NIGER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barnabe Tanagued</td>
<td>Cameroon – UNDP Prog strategic advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benedicte Ntongong</td>
<td>Cameroon – UNDP Prog strategic advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGen (Acting MGen) Bouba Dobekreoo</td>
<td>Comd, Sector 1, FMM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boukar Margaza</td>
<td>Ministère de l’éducation de base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capitaine Landry Diffo</td>
<td>Gendarmerie – Head Mayo Sava/Mayo Moskota</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Mback</td>
<td>Head of Stabilization, Chad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel Epale</td>
<td>Commanding Officer, FMM Bn, Cameroon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col Martin Luther Ashetkuan Mouchingam</td>
<td>Chief of Staff MNJTF Sector1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felix Ntumba</td>
<td>OCHA SIM Coordinator, Maroua, Cameroon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florian Morier</td>
<td>Head of Stabilization / UNDP Programme Manager, Cameroon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerald Guelmbang Djerandoubam</td>
<td>CIMIC Advisor- Chad (RSF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issaka Mamane Ali</td>
<td>RSS_UNDP CSO Development Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibrahim Djagra</td>
<td>Cameroon - UNDP Stabilization Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idris Nsangou</td>
<td>Cameroon - UNDP Political/Cultural advisor Cameroon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan-Jilles van der Hoeven</td>
<td>UNDP CIMIC Consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jehal de Meritens</td>
<td>OCHA, Cameroon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Sanderson</td>
<td>UKSU Nigeria (Maiduguri) – CIMIC Coord Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaibassou Daniel</td>
<td>President du Conseil Regional, Far Northern Region, Cameroon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Koukougnon Attebi Narcisse</td>
<td>RSF Senior Programme Security Specialist (Alternate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lacina Barro</td>
<td>UNDP Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt Col Claude Raoud Chakoua</td>
<td>RMIA4 Interface to CIMIC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Major Tom Wallis</td>
<td>BHC Abuja – CT and Extremism Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>Margaret Alm</td>
<td>Sub Regional Security Specialist West Africa, UNDP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mizuho Yokoi</td>
<td>Head of Stabilization, Nigeria (NE Sub-Office)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paul Turay</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Roel Debruyne</td>
<td>Charges des Affaires, Humanitaires and UN-CMCord, OCHA, Cameroon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shiam Vidurupola</td>
<td>NIGERIA - Security Coordination Expert</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tina Gewis</td>
<td>Regional ICLA, Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tony Kouemo</td>
<td>Cameroon - Monitoring and Evaluation Reporting Consultant, UNDP Cameroon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Valentina Filippini</td>
<td>RSS-UNDP Monitoring and Evaluation Reporting Consultant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Virgilio Silva</td>
<td>Security Consultant – West Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Millan Atam</td>
<td>Charges des Affaire Humanitaires and Chef du sous-Bureau OCHA Diffa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capitaine Oumarou</td>
<td>ACM Diffa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position/Role</td>
</tr>
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<td>-----------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moussa Oumarou</td>
<td>Point Focal du Gouverneur de Diffa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boukar Abatcha</td>
<td>Coordinator RSF Diffa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aliou Abdou</td>
<td>UNDSS Diffa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abdou Karim Ousman</td>
<td>UNDSS Diffa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hubert Nzikimuna</td>
<td>Chef du sous-bureau CICR Diffa</td>
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<td>Aba Malam Walam</td>
<td>CICR Diffa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ibrahim Aboubacar</td>
<td>Former CIMIC Advisor Diffa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aboukari Issa</td>
<td>Président Association des Jeunes Diffa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yaolé Kabirou</td>
<td>Chef du sous bureau Search for Common Ground, Diffa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abdou Marah Mamadou</td>
<td>Alternative Espace Citoyenne (Diffa)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mahamane Habou</td>
<td>Réseau des jeunes du Bassin du Lac Tchad</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aichatou Moukaila</td>
<td>ONG LARUSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tope Famuyide</td>
<td>AU-MNJTF Humanitarian Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Titus Manga</td>
<td>CIMIC Focal Point, Cameroon National Window</td>
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